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Ac cording to estimates made after the war, approximately 800–1000 people 
collaborated with the Krakow Gestapo during World War II. The historian Leszek Gondek 
suggests that at the end of the occupation the Gestapo could call on the services of 
2000 informants. They came from various social and professional backgrounds, and 
their contacts with the German authorities were both regular as well as spontaneous, 
depending above all else on the dynamics of the occupation and the conditions at any 
given time. Their ranks were mostly made up of Poles and Volksdeutsche, as well as 
a small group of Ukrainians and Jews – of which there were around 20.1
The  subject of the present analysis is not entirely unknown to researchers; however, 
the source literature is rather limited. Many papers have been published on the subject 
of collaboration in occupied Poland,2 as well as on the history of Krakow during World 
War II as a whole.3 On the other hand, no separate study has focused on individual cases 
of collaboration with the invaders or the phenomenon of delators (denouncers)4 in the 
1 GONDEK, Polska karząca 1939–1945, 114. See: J ARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, Wymuszona współpraca czy 
zdrada?
2 See e.g.:  KOTT, Obrońcy kolaboracjonizmu, 179–183.  SZAROTA, Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni, 
125–137. M ADAJCZYK, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, 256. MA DAJCZYK, Między neutralną współpracą 
ludności terytoriów okupowanych a kolaboracją z Niemcami, 181–196. RIN GS, Leben mit dem Feind. FRI EDRICH, 
Problem polskiej kolaboracji, 46–52. GROS S, Themes for a Social History, 24 sqq. GROS S, Upiorna dekada, chapter 
Upiorna dekada. STRZ EMBOSZ, Rzeczpospolita podziemna, 88–123. MADAJ CZYK, Zdrada – współdziałanie – 
pasywność, 112–121. MADAJCZY K, ‘Zdrada i kolaboracja’, 91–103. TAUBER, ‘Ko llaboration’ in Nordosteuropa.
3 The most important studies on this topic include:  CHROBACZYŃSKI, Postawy, zachowania, nastroje. 
 CHROBACZYŃSKI, Kraków 1939–1945, 247–254. ST RÖDER, Pokłosie pobytu w Krakowie, 141–146. SOW A, 
Kraków i krakowianie, 7–13. KULE R, Kraków 1939–45, 26–40. CHWALB A, Dzieje Krakowa, vol. 5. CHWALB A, 
Kraków w historiografi i, 79. KLUCZE WSKI, Bez zaciemnienia. CZOCHE R, W okupowanym Krakowie.
4 The fi rst and, to date, only attempt to investigate the themes of collaboration and denunciation in occupied 
Poland, as well as study surviving anonymous denunciations, was undertaken by  ENGELKING, Szanowny 
panie gistapo. This problem is also addressed in passing in studies on the history of the Jewish community 
in occupied Krakow, in the context of denunciations of Jews. The most important publications on denouncers 
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capital of the General Government.5 These problems have yet to be investigated as, to 
date, they have only been addressed in a few analyses, and even then merely in passing. 
The most important are those by Józef Bratko,6 Anetta Rybacka,7 Andrzej Chwalba,8 
Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk,9 Elżbieta Rączy,10 Ryszard Kotarba,11 Martyna Grądzka-
Rejak,12 Witold Medykowski13 and Alicja Jarkowska-Natkaniec.14 The abovementioned 
authors cited specifi c examples of collaboration, including in the context of relations 
between Poles and Jews.
The main goal of this paper is not only to describe the activities of individuals 
(denouncers, informers and agents) who collaborated with the authorities of occupied 
Krakow, but also to analyse their fates after the war, especially in terms of the way 
society settled scores with them. Seeing as this is a broad and complex area of research 
requiring a separate analysis, I shall not focus on the problem of institutionalized 
collaboration.
The outbreak of World War II and the ruthless policy of the Third Reich towards the 
residents of occupied territories led not only to the erosion of social ties, but also to 
the loss of any sense of solidarity. Individuals pursued their own selfi sh goals, with 
their sole interest in mind. That sort of behaviour was encouraged by economic and 
institutional chaos, as well as by the precarious structure of the German rule, consisting 
of rival agencies, constantly competing with each other. Many people took advantage 
of those circumstances to settle old scores, for example by denouncing their enemies 
to the Nazis. This kind of attitude was common in most cities of occupied Europe – for 
instance, in and around Lyon, France.15 The situation in Western Europe was, however, 
diff erent from the situation in Poland during World War II; there, death sentences were 
delivered without hesitation on a daily basis, by all the parties involved.
The character of occupied Krakow was defi ned by its multi-layered nature. This 
nature was due to the marginality of the Polish local government in the city, the 
“polyphonic” nature of the resistance movement and the structure of the Polish 
Underground State. Various authorities decided on the direction of the denunciations: 
citizens of Krakow denounced people not only to the Germans, but also to the PUS. 
From the point of view of social behaviours, there was little diff erence between those 
are:  FITZPATRICK – GELLATELY, Accusatory Practices. G ELLATELY, Denunciation as a Subject of Historical Research, 
16–29. WI LLIAMS, Letters of Denunciation.
5 This subject has been tackled in more depth by researchers of the history of Warsaw and the Warsaw 
region during World War II. Barbara Engelking has provided particularly valuable insights into the activities of 
blackmailers and informers : ENGELKING Jest taki piękny słoneczny dzień. Others include:  GRABOWSKI, Ja tego 
Żyda znam!  PERSON, Jews accusing Jews, 225–247, as well as a collective study: E NGELKING – GRABOWSKI, Dalej 
jest noc.
6  BRATKO, Gestapowcy. BEDNAREK, Kraków – czas okupacji 1939–1945.
7  RYBICKA, Instytut Niemieckiej Pracy Wschodniej.
8 CHWALBA, Dzieje Krakowa, vol. 5.
9 MŁYNARCZYK, Pomiędzy współpracą a zdradą, 103–132.
10  RĄCZY, Zagłada Żydów.
11  KOTARBA, Niemiecki obóz w Płaszowie.
12  GRĄDZKA-REJAK, Kobieta żydowska.
13 MĘDYKOWSKI, Przeciw swoim.
14 JARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, Wymuszona współpraca czy zdrada?
15 See:  WILLIAMS, Letters of Denunciation, 136–152.
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forms of denunciation. In Krakow, this phenomenon was volatile and complex, which 
I shall attempt to emphasize in the main part of the paper.
Krakow during World War II
In 1939, Krakow had a population of 259,000; two years later, this number had 
grown to approximately 321,000.16 Several factors were behind the constant and rapid 
changes in Krakow’s population. First of all, after the city was made the capital of the 
General Government in October 1939, it began to attract increasing numbers of civil 
servants (i.e. clerks) and military personnel, along with their families. Furthermore, the 
city had to cope with a mass infl ux of refugees from territories annexed to the Third 
Reich, in particular from the Greater Poland, Pomerania, and Silesia regions, many of 
them Jews and Ukrainians. Finally, in 1941 two municipalities and 28 rural communities 
were incorporated into Krakow, thereby establishing “Die Regierung Stadt Krakau”.17 
According to the census carried out by the Nazi authorities in the GG in May 1943, 
Krakow’s population was comprised of the following: 251,912 Poles (85.5 %), 20,997 
Germans (7.4 %), 8,753 Jews (3 %), 1,947 Ukrainians (0.6 %) and 1,184 representatives 
of other nations, e.g. Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Latvians, Czechs, Slovaks and 
Italians (0.4 %), giving a total of 284,793 persons.18 These estimates are imprecise, as 
the number of citizens may have reached as high as 319,00019 or more.
One of Krakow’s unique features was that, besides functioning as the capital of the 
General Government20 and the administrative centre for the Krakow region, where all 
central-state civil and political institutions were located, it was also divided (in 1942) 
into three separate urban spaces: the “Aryan” quarter (inhabited by Poles, Germans 
and others), the Krakow ghetto21 and the German camp in Płaszów.22
16  Mały Rocznik Statystyczny, 1939, 152.  Małopolska Agencja Prasowa, 8 May 1943, no. 7, p. 3.
17 CHWALBA, Okupowany Kraków, 33–37. C HROBACZYŃSKI, Kraków – „stolica” Generalgouvernement, 237–
238.
18  Małopolska Agencja Prasowa, 1940, no. 7, p. 3.
19  Goniec Krakowski, 26 October 1944.
20 General Government – an administrative body established on 26 October 1939 (pursuant to a decree 
issued by Adolf Hitler on 12 October 1939) in that part of occupied Polish territory which had not been annexed 
to the Reich. 
21 The Krakow ghetto was created in March 1941 by the Nazi authorities in Podgórze district. It covered an area 
of approx. 20 ha in size and included 320 buildings and houses, in which 15–20,000 Jews were quartered. The 
fi nal liquidation of the ghetto began on 13 March 1943, when the SS, police and Sonderdienst units drove 6,000 
to 8,000 Jews out of the ghetto and transported them to the concentration camp in Płaszów.
22 The German camp in Płaszów functioned between 1942 and 1944, approx. 5 km from Krakow; it covered an 
area of 80 hectares. Initially, it functioned as a labour camp; later, it was transformed into a concentration camp. 
At its height it had a prisoner population totaling 30,000 (27,000 Jews and approx. 3,000 Poles).
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The authorities of the General Government established their headquarters in 
Krakow,23 as did the security services, the public order, district,24 regional and city 
authorities,25 and many diff erent units of the German police, including its political 
(Gestapo), security (Sipo), and criminal (Kripo) branches as well as the ‘Order’ police 
(Orpo) and Protection police (Schupo).26 The Germans occupied the headquarters of the 
city’s most important offi  ces as well as those of its social and economic institutions, 
including the General Directorate for Eastern Railways, the German Postal Service in 
the East, and the Central Welfare Council. Jan Dąbrowski recalled:
Krakow was swarming with Germans, both in uniform and civilian clothes, yelling 
and shouting, and acting more and more brutally towards the Polish citizens […]. 
Impoverished refugees who returned to the city after many months of wandering 
often found their homes had been robbed by the Germans.27
National policies constituted an important part of Nazi occupation policy in Poland 
during World War II. The German authorities made every eff ort to deepen the divide 
between ethnic groups and antagonize the diff erent communities that made up Polish 
society at the time. Krakow became one of the most important links in the chain of 
the Nazi German system of organized oppression. Two mutually hostile subsystems 
came to life inside this system: that of the invaders, and that of the citizens of the 
occupied territory. Over the years, relations between those contrasting worlds evolved, 
depending on various factors – but they remained hostile nonetheless; they were also 
strongly dependent on processes taking place inside those subsystems.28
The relationship between the local population and the Nazi authorities, especially 
in terms of collaboration in the fi rst months of the war, was shaped by the tradition 
and the history of the city (the outcome of relations between the Kingdom of Poland 
and Galicia, and the attitudes of Krakow’s ‘intelligentsia’),29 which had been brutally 
and viciously dismantled by the occupiers. The German occupation changed, rather 
radically, the city’s ancient social fabric, violating many long-established values and 
23 From April 1941, the GG government was headed by the state secretary who oversaw 12 main 
departments: internal aff airs (in German: Hauptabteilung Innere Verwaltung), the treasury (Hauptabteilung 
Finanzen), justice (Hauptabteilung Justiz), economy (Hauptabteilung Wirtschaft), food (Hauptabteilung 
Ernährung und Landwirtschaft), forests (Hauptabteilung Forsten), labour (Hauptabteilung Arbeit), propaganda 
(Hauptabteilung Propaganda), science and education (Hauptabteilung Wissenschaft und Unterricht), 
construction (Hauptabteilung Bauwesen), railways (Hauptabteilung Eisenbahn) and post (Hauptabteilung 
Post). See: Administrative Regulation no. 1 of 7 April 1941 to the 3rd Regulation on the Reconstruction of the 
Administration of the General Government (Organization of the General Governor’s Government) of 16 March 
1941. In: WEH, Prawo Generalnego Gubernatorstwa, A122a.
24 Krakow was administered by the following governors: Otto Wächter (November 1939 to 12 January 1942), 
Richard Wendler (31 January 1942 to 26 May 1943), Ludwig Losacker (26 May to 10 October 1943), Kurt Ludwig 
von Burgsdorff  (1 December 1943 to January 1945).
25 The regional governors of Krakow during the occupation were as follows: Ernst Zörner (September 1939 to 
February 1940), Carl Schmidt (February 1940 to March 1941), Rudolf Pavlu (April 1941 to April 1943) and Josef 
Kramer (April 1943 to January 1945).
26 On the structure of the GG Government, the RSHA etc., see:  MĄCZYŃSKI, Organizacyjno-prawne aspekty, 
467–482. For more on this subject, see: M ADAJCZYK, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce. M ADAJCZYK, 
Generalna Gubernia w planach hitlerowskich.
27 DĄBROWSKI, Rządy niemieckie w Krakowie, 14. See also:  BEDNAREK – ZIMMERER, Okupanci.
28 CHROBACZYŃSKI, Kraków 1939–1945.
29  BIENIARZÓWNA – MAŁECKI, Dzieje Krakowa, vol. 3.
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standards. It also changed the mentality of society, disrupting citizens’ sense of stability 
and security. 
Many underground  newspapers in circulation in occupied Krakow published articles 
focusing on the need for eff ective resistance against the Nazis while at the same time 
promoting what it deemed appropriate moral stances among citizens. The main features 
of the “civil struggle” against the Germans included the following:
1. Maintaining the fi ghting spirit and moral stances worthy of the Polish Nation;
2. Counteracting the destruction of humanity resulting from Nazi doctrine; 
3. Preventing the plunder and theft of the nation’s cultural and material assets; 
4. Spreading word abroad that the fi ght continues in Poland; 
5. Forcing the invaders to maintain a large military presence inside Polish borders so 
as to weaken their forces elsewhere; 
6. Refusing under any circumstances to weaken the will resist.30
However, the terror of the occupation led citizens in Krakow to react in diff erent, 
often extreme ways, from passive and active resistance through to submission, and 
even to collaboration with the Nazi authorities.31 These actions destabilized the fabric 
of society (through fear, uncertainty, the threat of arrest, imprisonment or execution). 
People feared for their own lives and the lives of their families, and mistrusted their 
neighbours – and the underground press fuelled this sense of terror and foreboding, 
warning readers about the presence of agents and informers, and publishing the names 
of individuals suspected of committing acts of high treason. Gossips, busybodies, 
newsmongers, denouncers and snitches were reviled and stigmatized. The last two 
named groups comprised both people who openly or anonymously denounced others 
to the Germans, and intelligence agents or persons who (occasionally or regularly) 
cooperated with them, thereby becoming instruments of terror at the hands of the 
invaders.
Agents and individual collaborators in occupied Krakow32
During the occupation collaborators working for the German authorities in Poland, 
and in particular for the Nazi security apparatus, fell into various categories. The 
Gestapo initially divided its agents into two groups based on formal criteria: Werk-
Personen (W-Personen) and Vertrauens-Personen (V-Personen). In 1943, two more 
categories were introduced: Auskunfts-Personen (A-Personen) and Gewährs-Personen 
(G-Personen), whereas Orpo agents were called Zuträger-Personen (Z-Personen), as 
they ran their own informer networks. However, the broadest category is that used by 
the author of the present study, namely informers of security services in the occupied 
territory, which comprised the following groups:
1. V-Leute – most trusted agents, members of the NSDAP,
2. Agenten – agents who were not members of the NSDAP,
3. Zubringer – regular informers, such as doctors, members of the clergy etc.,
30  CHROBACZYŃSKI, Postawy, zachowania, nastroje, 100.
31 See: CHROBACZYŃSKI, Postawy, zachowania, nastroje, 100.
32 The present author fi rst analysed this problem in her work entitled Wymuszona współpraca czy zdrada? 
This study deepens the analysis as a part of research under a grant of the National Center of Science (SONATINA 
2). The author is currently working on a project entitled Zjawisko donosicielstwa w powiecie krakowskim w 
latach 1939–1945 [Phenomenon of collaboration in the Krakow district, 1939–1945] (project no. 2018/28/C/
HS3/00108).
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4. Helfershelfer (H-Leute) – occasional informers, and
5. Unzuverlässige (U-Leute) – criminals and corrupt individuals, occasionally used by 
the SD.33
The main aim of this study is to describe the activities of the last three groups of 
informers and denouncers: occasional and regular collaborators of the Krakow Gestapo. 
It was they who usually provided the occupying authorities with vital information 
concerning members of communities with which they were in contact every day. They 
functioned in their social environments and gathered information concerning their 
neighbours, relatives, families and colleagues. Envy, jealousy, revenge, score-settling, 
fear of repression, economic competition and family quarrels were the most common 
factors motivating individuals to denounce their neighbours and begin collaborating 
with the German authorities and police.34
In my research, I use terminology that was adopted during World War II, with a few 
exceptions. In this study, “agents” are synonymous with “informers” and “confi dants”, 
i.e. persons regularly or occasionally in contact with the Gestapo. “Denouncers”, on 
the other hand, are synonymous with “snitches”, i.e. persons who reported to the 
Gestapo sporadically or had a one-off  interaction with the authorities. The “services” 
of the latter grouping were employed as a weapon against a particular community, and 
their main motive was personal gain, to the detriment of other people, which often 
resulted from the fact that these individuals had no other means of subsistence for 
their families, or simply treated “snitching” as a mode of survival.
Another incentive for contacting the security apparatus was the remuneration 
that informers could expect to receive – in cash or in kind (vodka, cigarettes, clothes, 
sugar etc.); they could also count on the authorities’ help in overcoming “red tape” 
regarding their economic activities. Moreover, any information deemed useful by 
the authorities could be given in exchange for an individual’s exemption from forced 
labour in the Third Reich.
There were also those who chose to barter their freedom for collaboration with the 
Germans.35 Reportedly, a relatively large number of occasional agents were willing to do 
so. According to Borodziej, in Tomaszów province, for example, the military police was 
itself served by two to eight informers.36 The number of German collaborators based 
in the Krakow region remains unknown; however, the archives of the Krakow district 
of the home army provide us with the names of more than 500 informers.37 Kazimierz 
Albin, a member of the Krakow underground, recalled after the war:
Krakow was unlike other cities. Many civilians, along with countless Germans, 
an exceptionally large garrison of soldiers and police, and a spider’s web of 
agents and confi dants made any combat mission in the city almost impossible.38
33 BIERNACKI, Okupant a polski ruch oporu, 71. For a classifi cation of diff erent types of agents, see:  ARONSON, 
Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte, 155.
34 For more on denunciations and reports made by the local population to the German authorities in occupied 
Poland, see: ENGELKING, Szanowny Panie gistapo. GONDEK, Polska karząca 1939–1945, 100.
35 See e.g.:  Dziennik Polski, 1943, no. 613, p. 4 . Małopolska Agencja Prasowa, 1943, no. 11, p. 12.
36 BORODZIEJ, Terror i polityka, 89.
37  MOSKALIK, Zbrodniarz, 82.
38 ALBIN, List gończy, 146.
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Regular agents of the security apparatus were individuals who maintained 
regular contact with the Nazi authorities and who decided to cooperate with them 
on a permanent basis. These confi dants were given new identities, apartments and 
jobs. Usually, they reported to their “guardians”, i.e. German police offi  cers who met 
them in public places or private homes. Borodziej claimed that the average monthly 
remuneration of such agents amounted to 100–200 marks, plus bonuses and additional 
compensation “in kind”. Eff ective cooperation often resulted in, among other things, 
the informer’s relatives being released from German prisons or concentration camps. 
An agent’s principal task was to infi ltrate the Polish underground, even at the lowest 
levels. The security police recruited professional agents from among active members 
of the resistance. Agents were selected based on their past activities and their role 
in the underground.
Professional agents were the most valuable source of information for the security 
police. Their anonymity was particularly guarded, and details of their cooperation were 
kept in diff erent places for safety purposes. These agents declared their willingness to 
collaborate with the authorities in writing. The security police assigned them a coded 
number, and subsequently acquainted them with the area they were supposed to cover. 
Informers for the security apparatus often used the help of the Volksdeutsche, who 
recruited snitches and agents among Poles.39 They reported on the prevailing moods 
of the local population, and often provoked individuals into expressing their views on 
the occupation and the authorities, and the data gathered in this way was registered 
by security police functionaries.40
In addition to sounding out the attitudes of their fellow Poles occasional denouncers 
primarily informed the Germans (willingly) of Jews residing illegally in the city.41 As 
Barbara Engelking rightly observed, agents became, in a way, cogs in the terror machine 
and an integral part of the system the Gestapo relied upon – especially by sending 
letters of denunciation that supported German authorities not for money, but out of 
sheer cynicism.42 The unpaid “snoops” of the security services deliberately stoked 
up fears of repression among the local population, and reinforced the conviction that 
the occupier was omnipotent and omnipresent in their everyday lives. These snoops 
were, undoubtedly, as much of a threat to Polish people and the Polish underground 
as “professional” or “paid” German agents. Anonymous letters sent to the Gestapo 
provide insights into political, economic, social and “racial” (i.e. in accordance with 
the provisions of the Nuremberg Laws) lives of Krakow citizens. In addition to reports 
informing the authorities of failures to comply with German regulations, activities of 
the underground and crimes committed by Jews (e.g. smuggling or illegal presence 
outside the ghetto), delators also sent in anonymous tip-off s against personal enemies.
Informers and denouncers in occupied Krakow 
During the war, offi  cers of the Krakow Gestapo had at their disposal a large number 
of denouncers and several intelligence networks comprising 10–20 agents. At the end 
of the occupation, the Krakow Gestapo reportedly had approximately 2000 informers 
39  BORODZIEJ, Terror i polityka, 86.
40  RAMME, Służba Bezpieczeństwa SS, 194–195.
41 FITZPATRICK – GELLATELY, Accusatory Practices, 1.
42  ENGELKING, Szanowny panie gistapo, 17.
76
on their books.43 Kurt Heinemeyer,44 a functionary of the Krakow Gestapo, testifi ed 
after the war that “in mid-1940 he was ordered to examine every detainee to assess 
their usefulness as potential informers”.45 His fi rst agent was a Pole, Karol Pfeiff er, who, 
during an operation against the Polish resistance at the beginning of the occupation, 
allegedly helped Heinemeyer gather intelligence on political organizations such as 
the Polish Socialist Party, the People’s Party and the National Radical Camp.46 Records 
show that the Kwast brothers, Gustaw and Maks, also regularly reported to the Nazis.47 
In 1939, they signed the Volkslist and volunteered for service as translators at the KdS 
Krakow. Because of their place of residence, they knew the local environment and 
customs, as well as their “way around” the area.48
The 3rd and 4th departments of the KdS also oversaw an extensive network of 
agents, informers and residents.49 Their activities were mainly directed against Polish 
underground organizations. The scope of the responsibilities of these people depended 
on the department to which German functionaries belonged. Before the informer 
networks were reorganized in 1942,50 Gestapo collaborators’ personal fi les were held 
in Referat [Department] IV-N, which was supposed to manage and supervise the work of 
the informers and assign them missions. In reality, the SD and the Gestapo ran partially 
separate networks. The SD managed to retain only a certain number of informers, 
whereas the Gestapo, thanks to fi nancial support from the Referat, was able to expand 
its intelligence group signifi cantly.51
Heads of departments and subdivisions of the Krakow Gestapo had their own 
informers and agents: Adolf Spilker, Albert Schulz, Heinrich Hamann, Paul Emil Groner, 
43  GONDEK, Polska karząca 1939–1945, 114.
44 SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Heinrich August Dietrich Heinemeyer – born in Hannover on 27 December 1907; 
from 1940, a functionary of KdS Krakow; between 1943 and 1945, he was head of the Podreferat [subdivision] 
IV-A-1 responsible for fi ghting against Polish left-wing organizations. He was handed over to the Polish justice 
system in 1947.
45  Archiuwm Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w Krakowie [AIPN Kr], sign. 502/2246, Kurt Heinemeyer criminal 
case fi le, p. 130.
46 AIPN Kr, sign. 502/2246, Kurt Heinemeyer criminal case fi le, pp. 130–131.
47 Maks Kwast was born on 15 August 1909 in Łódź; he moved to Krakow before the outbreak of WWII. On 
13 January 1939, he volunteered to work for the Gestapo. He was employed as a translator for the political 
police in the Jewish Department. His supervisor in his fi rst weeks was Oskar Brandt; later, he was assigned to 
a group managed by Becher, in which, according to Kwast, he worked as an auxiliary police offi  cer until May 
1941. In May 1941, Kurt Heinemeyer became his supervisor; Kwast claimed Heinemeyer had appointed him 
criminal secretary. However, Heinemeyer did not mention any such promotion in his testimony. It is more likely 
that Kwast continued to work as a translator for the Gestapo, and remained a salaried member of staff  in that 
department, located on Pomorska street, until the end of the occupation. He was sentenced to death after the 
war and executed on 18 August 1948. AIPN Kr, sign. 010/3900, Maks Kwast case fi le; AIPN Kr, sign. 425/302, 
prisoner fi le: Kwast Maks.
48 AIPN Kr, sign. 010/3900, Maks Kwast case fi le; AIPN Kr, sign. 425/302, prisoner fi le: Kwast Maks, p. 11.
49 KdS – German Offi  ce of the Commandant of the Security Police and the Security Services for the Krakow 
District.
50 The overhaul was a result of organizational changes in the RSHA in 1942 and a renumbering of departments. 
It was also in response to large-scale operations launched by the security services against the Polish 
underground. See:  STRZEMBOSZ, Akcje zbrojne podziemnej Warszawy, 115–116. In 1943, more than a thousand 
agents and informers of the German security services located in the GG were eliminated. See:  GONDEK, W 
imieniu Rzeczypospolitej, 138.
51  BIERNACKI, Okupant a polski ruch oporu, 73. Information regarding goings-on in the city was also gathered 
by “fi eld agents” of the Orpo, the military police, administration, and the military. Furthermore, the “blue 
uniforms” had their own informers. See:  PIETRZYKOWSKI, Hitlerowcy w Częstochowie, 107.
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Kurt Heinemeyer, Rudolf Körner, Erich Vollbrecht, Kurt Thomsen, Wilhelm Raschwitz, 
Erich Mittman, Paul Siebert, Oskar Brandt, Wilhelm Kunde, Heinrich Mayer, Friedrich 
Popping, Otto von Malotki, Herman Hische, Otto Gundlach, Herman Hische, Edward 
Fischer, Edgar Schultz and Robert Weissman;52 their job was to monitor the local 
population based on strict criteria.
Many occasional snitches who collaborated with the Nazi collaborators had a poor 
reputation for trustworthiness – they included a certain number of pathological liars, 
mythomaniacs and swindlers, and only a handful were reliable agents. The Gestapo 
were, in a way, resigned to relying on their own regular informers for help. As Klaus-
Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul have concluded, “without an army of volunteer 
informers, the Gestapo would have been forced to operate blindly”.53 Those who do not 
agree with this theory claim that the Gestapo used reports from private parties; but, 
on the other hand, they argued that there existed an entire web of German institutions 
whose mission was to surveil society and facilitate the work of the Gestapo. German 
researchers also claim that approximately 70 % of trials held in courts were based 
on anonymous letters sent to the Gestapo.54 In the case of the Krakow Gestapo it is 
impossible to draw such clear conclusions based on what remains of its archives. Of 
the approximately 2500 cases investigated by the district court in Krakow during the 
war only 264 case fi les have survived. Of these, the prosecutor initiated proceedings 
based on 5 anonymous letters and more than 30 reports submitted by denouncers.55 
In several cases, individuals making false accusations in such reports were themselves 
convicted.
The Krakow underground intercepted several hundred anonymous or signed letters 
written by inhabitants of Krakow and the surrounding areas and sent to the police 
or the occupying authorities containing information on political, racial, economic, 
social or fi nancial matters. The examples of denunciations that I was able to obtain 
and use as reference in the paper are insuffi  cient to recreate the so-called “denouncer 
profi le”56 or to approach the problem statistically, dividing that group according to their 
social/professional affi  liation, education, sex, patriotic sentiments or lack thereof. It 
is, undoubtedly, a subject that should be treated and discussed separately. For the 
purposes of this paper, I shall present the dominant aspects of the denunciations 
I have managed to study, along with their characteristic features. They were usually 
handwritten; several were typewritten – the latter were longer and more detailed. 
Only in several cases is it justifi ed to suspect that the authors of those denunciations 
had – or did not have – elementary or higher education. Some conclusions might be 
drawn based on the vocabulary, grammatical or spelling correctness, overall coherency 
of the text, and the authors’ ability to convey information. I am thinking particularly 
of denunciations written on postcards – some of them were logical, others chaotic. 
Subjects tackled by authors were either thematically related or completely devoid of 
sense. Some denunciations were written with a pen, others with a pencil. Some were 
52  JARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, Wymuszona współpraca czy zdrada?, 248–250.
53  MALLMANN – GERHARD, Herrschaft und Alltag, 158.
54 MALLMANN – GERHARD, Herrschaft und Alltag, 158.
55 JARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, Criminal Cases.
56 The analysis of that problem demands separate research. Due to the limited length of the paper and the fact 
that it is only loosely related to the main subject, I shall present only the most important conclusions from my 
research to date.
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very neat, others very sloppy. Some authors took care to retain the structure of a formal 
letter, dividing the text into the usual “introduction – main body – conclusion pattern”, 
providing their contact details (!) and using terms of respect: “Yours sincerely”, “Best 
wishes” etc. Understanding the intentions of other denouncers demanded, however, 
a lot of concentration, and in some cases, imagination. Sentences were short and 
incoherent. Most of them were written on postcards, with big, capital letters and large 
spacing between lines.
Denunciations were addressed both to the police authorities (Gestapo, Polish police, 
criminal police) and to the administration (e.g. the housing executive). One of the 
addressees of those letters was the aforementioned Hans Frank, the general governor. 
Documents were written mostly in German, less often in Polish, even though Polish 
citizens’ knowledge of the former language was usually poor. It is hard to say, at this 
stage of my research, if the addressees’ motivations – most of them social – were more 
prone to use “legality” or “patriotism” as an excuse for their actions. The latter category 
especially was absent in the documents I have studied; the most common reason was 
dislike towards the targeted person. Less frequently, the reason was economic or anti-
Semitic. The subjects tackled in the denunciations, however, corresponded with the 
dynamically changing situation in the country. For instance, from 1942, the number 
of denunciations targeting Jews increased; even before that, prior to creation of the 
ghetto, the opportunistic public frowned upon Jewish families occupying houses in 
Polish and German residential quarters. New tenants were treated with mistrust and 
suspected of illegal activities or collaboration with the Nazis; they were seen as a threat 
to the status quo. In 1944, denunciations related to fi nance started appearing – authors 
informed on frauds and their illegal businesses. It should be noted, however, that the 
dramatic increase in the number of denunciations was purely social in nature and was 
not particularly sought after by the German authorities due to their insignifi cance. This 
was often confi rmed by the denouncers themselves, who wrote letters to the Gestapo 
complaining of lack of reaction to their previous off ense reports.57
Denouncers communicated with the Nazi administration in both Polish and German 
(in writing or in person at the police station). When contacting the Kripo or the Polish 
police (PP), informers used Polish. Most policemen had served in the national police 
before the war; however, few of them were stationed in Krakow at the time. Those who 
took part in investigations supervised by the prosecutor were not originally from the 
city, but came from neighbouring provinces: Bochnia or Miechów. Franciszek Kózka 
served in the PP in Chrzanów,58 while Jan Błoński was employed in an automobile repair 
workshop in Lviv.59 Stanisław Turski “Wojtek” was born in Krakow and worked as an 
intelligence agent for the Polish police in Krakow, while at the same time cooperating 
with the ZWZ/AK [Union of Armed Struggle/Home Army – from 1943 he was a member 
of the ‘Prostokąt’ [‘Rectangle’] unit).60
57 I shall analyse those problems in more detail in a book that I have recently been working on, dedicated in 
particular to the phenomenon of denouncing in the occupied Krakow, as part of the aforementioned research 
grant.
58 AIPN Kr, sign. 502/527, Franciszek Kózka case fi le.
59 Both of them were accused of treason but acquitted after the war. At the time, they lived at the same house 
on P. Popiela Street (no. 12).
60 AIPN Kr, sign. 502/ GK 164/380, vol. 1, p. 82, case fi le: Nordmann Ewald vel. Nordynski.
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The police mostly intervened in political and racial matters, many of which were 
merely an excuse to settle scores with neighbours. That was the case with Józef Korajda, 
accused not only of illicit trading in pigs, but also of the unlawful possession of a fi rearm. 
However, the real reason was diff erent – one of the inhabitants of Luboszyca wanted 
revenge on his neighbour who had been terrorizing the locals.61 An analysis of the 
remaining documents shows that other denunciations were less interesting to the 
police. It took three anonymous letters to persuade them to take an interest in the 
illegal practices of Marian Sikora, who worked at the tobacco production plant. An 
investigation failed to produce any evidence of illicit practices.62
Denouncers and occasional agents were, as I have already mentioned, rewarded 
for their work – in cash or in kind, i.e. they were given food, vodka, cigarettes, clothes, 
underwear or textiles by their German supervisors. According to Kwast, a translator for 
the Gestapo, confi dants did not receive recompense for their work: “they were given 
things only when they’d done something useful. If it was something big, they earned 
more; if it was something less signifi cant, they earned less for it”.63 Among those who 
did not seek compensation were delators: their contact with German authorities was 
regular, one-off  or spontaneous; they acted either overtly or covertly. They wrote 
reports or appeared at police stations, informing the authorities of any violations in 
occupation law committed by their neighbours. Their actions were often motivated 
simply by personal grudges and only some of them treated it as a source of profi t, often 
through the blackmailing of Jews hiding from persecution.64
Informers came from various social groups, among them members of the liberal 
professions (e.g. businessmen, clerks, teachers, academic teachers, farmers), former 
policemen and soldiers, as well as petty criminals and members of the ZWZ/AK 
underground. However, Sławomir Buryła, literary scholar also observed that “a 
signifi cant number of those people were poorly educated”.65 Understandably, the war 
gave rise to a new class of people who specialized in informing on Jews and people 
who failed to comply with the occupation law as well as on members of the resistance. 
Their motives were always the same: money, personal confl icts originating from before 
the war, fear or anti-Semitism.
While informers and denouncers posed a threat to inhabitants of the Krakow ghetto 
and Płaszów concentration camp, their actions could have even deadlier consequences 
for those Jews still hiding on the “Aryan side”. Jews seeking refuge in bunkers in the 
ghetto (after its liquidation) in 1943 were sometimes denounced not only by Poles who 
made a living out of seeking out the hiding places of Jews in the city and surrounding 
areas,66 but also by their own co-religionists, which was especially painful.67 The latter 
61  Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie [ANKr], sign. 29/1988/2124, Marian Sikora case fi le.
62 ANKr, sign. 29/1988/2124, Marian Sikora case fi le.
63 AIPN Kr, sign. 010/3900, Maks Kwast case fi le, p. 43.
64 See: ENGELKING, Szanowny panie gistapo.
65  BURYŁA, Wokół Zagłady, 122.
66 The search for Jews in and around Krakow was also conducted by a special task force of the German police 
(known as the Jagdkommando), composed of regular police and MP functionaries, created on 2 February 1943. 
Its main mission was to fi nd and kill Jews who had gone to ground. See: AIPN Kr, sign. 1/857, J. Buszko, R. Kotarba, 
Działalność represyjna okupanta wobec ludności polskiej za pomoc udzielaną Żydom (w rejonie krakowskim), p. 5.
67 This was at a time period during which the Nazi authorities were liquidating all the ghettos in the region, 
seeking out Jews trying to avoid arrest or deportation. The Krakow ghetto ceased to function on 13 March 1943. 
Mojżesz Brodman and Szymon Szpic were among those Jews who collaborated with the Germans, along with 
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group, however, were not very numerous;68 their actions were motivated by other 
reasons. They also faced moral dilemmas. This fact should always be borne in mind 
when analysing this phenomenon. Polish police functionaries were also engaged in 
hunting down Jewish fugitives.69
Some confi dants and informers “specialized” in denouncing Jews living incognito 
on the “Aryan side”, which I shall mention only briefl y in order to outline the problem. 
They were denounced not only by their neighbours and agents, but also by their friends 
and relatives. In October 1939, the German authorities seized possession of Henryk 
Stecki’s medical practice after he had been accused of being a Jew. The informant was 
Stecki’s colleague who had known him before the war.70 The Polish Underground State 
started to condemn these actions in the fourth year of the war, which I shall discuss in 
more detail later. Many Jews from Krakow concealing their identities were blackmailed, 
and the blackmailers threatened to report them to the Germans. This was the reason 
why Anna Landermann was forced to move from place to place so as to avoid arrest.71 
The Garus family, who began using fake IDs in 1940, were less fortunate. In 1943, Jan 
and his daughter, Maria, were arrested after they were reported to the Krakow gestapo 
by Jan’s second wife, who subsequently took over her husband’s fortune. Jan Garus did 
not survive the occupation; his daughter returned to Krakow after the war and took 
Wanda Garus to court.72 In 1945, Mr Goldfi nger testifi ed before the Jewish Historical 
Commission:
After the liquidation of the Krakow ghetto and other cities, a great number of 
Jews and children took shelter in other quarters and in the neighbouring villages. 
Most of them were caught by agents and the “blue uniforms”; the detainees 
were kept in bunkers on Pomorska street without air, food or water; they were 
beaten; they kept them there for a few days, and then they were taken, half-dead, 
a few Jewish policemen. However, members of the Jewish Order Services were often confused with denouncers. 
Aaron Geldwerk mentioned the search for Jews hiding in the former ghetto area; in his testimony, given after 
the war, he recalls: ‘During the liquidation of the ghetto on 13 March 1943, I hid with my wife and my three 
children, along with 110 other people, in the attic of one of the houses abandoned during the relocation. Our 
hiding place was bricked up and concealed; we had a water supply, toilets, and reserves of food. The bunker was 
approx. 30 m long and 12 m wide. Odeman Brodman’s brother-in-law was hiding with us; Brodman came for 
him on the following day and promised that he would rescue all of us. We felt, however, that we were already 
doomed, as we were fairly certain that Brodman would report us. And we were right: Kunde came looking for us 
the next morning and when we saw him through a concealed window, we knew we had been betrayed. Kunde 
kept looking, knocking on walls; we knew he had been told exactly where to look, because he approached the 
correct wall, where the exit was very thoroughly masked with old bricks and lime, and he kept calling: »Juden, 
öff net, er wird euch nischt geschehen, ich in auch Jude«. […] On the following day, Kunde came with an entire OD 
unit led by Brodman. […] We were taken to the OD station. When we walked down the stairs, my son, Salomon, 
who was 20 at the time, saw Brodman and said that his fate would be far worse than ours, that God would punish 
him for it. We knew that around 100 people from the bunker had been arrested on the previous day and shot on 
the spot’. Arc hiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego [AŻIH], sign. 301/3366, pp. 1–2.
68 Most importantly, we should be aware of the actual scale of Jewish collaboration in occupied Krakow. Of 
the 800–1000 Nazi collaborators only 20 were Jewish. See: JARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, Wymuszona współpraca 
czy zdrada?
69 See:  FRYDEL, Ordinary Men?, 68–125.
70 AŻIH, sign. 301/445, an account by Henryk Stecki.
71 AŻIH, sign. 301/622, an account by Anna Landermann.
72 AIPN Kr, sign. 502/510, Maria Garus criminal case fi le, pp. 72–120.
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to Montelupich, where they were beaten all over again; every day, the corpses 
of a few murdered Jews were transported out of the prison.73
Informers in Płaszów usually tipped off  the commandants of illegal smuggling, 
planned escapes or hidden valuables. Most of them, with a few exceptions, remained 
anonymous or were merely mentioned by their last name, according to surviving 
records from the occupation. The information we have on them mostly comes from 
reports written by underground organizations and the “Żegota” Council to Aid Jews 
from 1943 and 1944. On 16 December 1943 the latter organization noted the death of 
40 people murdered in Płaszów, i.e. Jewish policemen and informers who had become 
liabilities.74 A separate issue concerned rumours that circulated in the camp regarding 
individuals often seen in the company of the most eager prisoner functionaries or 
camp personnel.75
Those reports, made either in writing or personally, initiated specifi c procedures 
based on legal and administrative regulations. They usually began with a notifi cation 
sent to a police station or an application register and were followed by an analysis of 
its contents. Subsequently, the notifi cation was referred to the relevant police unit 
working in conjunction with its Polish or German counterpart (Polish police, Kripo76 and 
Gestapo, especially); a case-handling functionary was appointed and an investigation 
was launched, which was then referred to the state authorities; the prosecutor’s offi  ce 
initiated criminal procedures, and the case was brought to trial and concluded with 
a fi nal verdict. Between 1939 and 1944, several hundred cases were referred to Krakow’s 
district and municipal courts by police units; many of them based on anonymous and 
signed denunciations. These were addressed to the Gestapo, Kripo, the Polish police, 
security police, the governor’s offi  ce, the directorate of German police, the public 
security division, the military police or even Hans Frank, the general governor himself.
The number of denunciations was relatively high in occupied Poland; post offi  ce 
employees working for Polish underground organizations managed to intercept some of 
them.77 In 1942 one of the cells of the “Skała” Independent Guerilla Battalion in Krakow 
was responsible for intercepting denunciations addressed to the Gestapo; it was led by 
Józef Baster, a.k.a. “Rak”,78 and it succeeded in “confi scating thousands of anonymous 
letters”.79 The counterintelligence unit overseeing the area covered by the main post 
offi  ce in the capital of the GG, where anonymous denunciations were intercepted, was 
73 AŻIH, sign. 301/574, an account by Mr Goldfi nger.
74 AŻIH, sign. 136, Varia z okresu okupacji 1939–1945 [Miscellanea from the occupation], a report by the 
Council to Aid Jews of 31 December 1943, p. 3.
75 For more on this subject, see:  JARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, Wybrane formy kolaboracji w obozie Płaszów.
76 In Poland, before World War II, the criminal police, known as the Służba Śledcza (“Investigation Bureau”), was 
part of the state police (PP). At the end of October 1939, however, it was separated from the PP and incorporated 
into the German Kriminalpolizi (Kripo), where it was referred to as Polnische Kriminalpolizei, i.e. the criminal 
police (PPK). Thus, PPK offi  cers became part of the iSicherheitspolizei (Sipo; security police). On the other hand, 
the Polish police of the General Government (the so-called navy blue one) was subordinate to the command of 
the order police (Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei; KdO).
77 See: MADOŃ, Pracownicy Poczty i Telekomunikacji.
78 The cell was created at the end of 1939 under the aegis of the “Orzeł Biały” [White Eagle] organization. 
During WWII, it continued to function under the supervision of the Krakow “Kedyw” Diversion Directorate. Its 
main goal was to intercept letters addressed to the Nazi authorities in which the sender’s details remained 
empty. Particular attention was also paid to the sender’s handwriting.
79 Based on an interview with Janusz Baster, Józef Baster’s son (5 February 2016).
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headed by Stefan Faber, a.k.a. “Stefan”, who supervised one of Baster’s cells.80 One fi le 
that has survived contains 250 reports to the German authorities from the years 1940 
and 1941, mostly concerning Warsaw and other towns (e.g. Otwock, Pruszków, Grójec, 
Lublin, Radom, Łódź and Biała Podlaska).81 Most of these denunciations were written by 
Poles, but some also came from Volksdeutsche and Jews. Their authors had a variety 
of professional backgrounds and represented various social groups and classes. This 
type of activity qualifi es, without a doubt, as collaboration.82 This was also the case 
with reports sent by Krakow citizens; however, they were harder to identify, mainly 
because most of them were written in German.
Activities of the Polish resistance
Underground organizations, such as the Secret Military Organization of the Krakow 
Garrison, which was incorporated into the Union of Armed Struggle, and later into the 
Home Army, were responsible for exposing and eliminating collaborators with the 
Gestapo. A civil resistance division was established towards the end of 1941. In 1942 
articles condemning “snitches” began to appear in the underground press, a trend 
that coincided with the establishment of the courts of Krakow’s District Government 
Delegation for Poland. Two years earlier, lists of Volksdeutsche were published; 
Poles acting to the detriment of the nation, e.g. working in or for German institutions, 
subscribing to the newspaper Goniec Krakowski, using the German names of streets 
and squares in their letters or “acting friendly towards the Germans” – were all put on 
a black list. In the third year of the war, the press warned of the threat posed by Poles 
returning to Krakow from POW camps, and published their personal details. As stated 
in one of the issues of Goniec Krakowski: “We do not want to condemn those gentlemen 
preemptively; however – as we are fairly sure of the credibility of this information – 
we would like to warn our citizens to steer clear of them”.83 The reasons for which the 
underground press warned citizens to be wary of these people are unknown, but they 
were probably suspected of acts of espionage.
A list of individuals accused of possible collaboration and of denouncing their fellow 
citizens was published in 1943. From that year onwards, the “Żelbet” group stepped 
up their intelligence operations under the auspices of the Home Army.84 Members of 
the “Alicja” platoon85 and the ‘B’ II unit of the Krakow Home Army, whose fi les covered 
fi ve divisions, also took it upon themselves to expose Nazi informers. The diversion 
and sabotage groups were composed of around 20 soldiers, which in turn were divided 
into patrols numbering fi ve or six individuals. The activities of the intelligence and 
80  DĄBROWA-KOSTKA, W okupowanym Krakowie, 43–44.
81 ENGELKING, Szanowny panie gistapo, 5.
82 ENGELKING, Szanowny panie gistapo, 5.
83  Goniec Krakowski, 1941.
84 J. Profi cz, Hasło ‘Jemioła’. ‘Sowiniec’ Archiwum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego [Archives of 
the Documenting Acts for Independence], sign. 364b; ibid., sign. 80 Adam Żuława aka ‘Gołąb’. Walki oddziału 
partyzanckiego ‘Żelbet I’; ibid., sign. 382, wspomnienia Karola Łysogórskiego aka ‘Gzymsik’; ibid., sign. 78 a, 
wspomnienia dowódcy Oddziału Partyzanckiego ‘Żelbet’: Kraków z walk stoczonych przez Oddział z Niemcami w 
1944 r.
85 See:  SKROBECKI, Podgórski pluton dywersyjny ‘Alicja’ Szarych Szeregów w Krakowie.
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counterintelligence were supervised at the time by Stanisław “Sprężyna” Czapkiewicz, 
who drew up a list of agents and confi dants suspected of working for the Gestapo.86
On 15 July 1943, the Directorate of Underground Resistance was established. 
Considering the fact that the fi rst reports on informers date back to the fi rst years of 
the war, the resistance’s response was somewhat belated.87 Reports compiled by the 
resistance, partially preserved in Polish archives, were written in 1943. They contain 
brief details on individuals whose actions were being monitored (fi rst and last name, 
charges, address) or detailed reports on reconnaissance operations in a suspect’s 
place of residence; in some cases, testimonies of witnesses were collected. The 
fi nal result of the diversionary unit’s eff orts was a list of names of agents, partially 
published in the “Małopolski Biuletyn Informacyjny” [Newsletter of the Lesser Poland 
Region] or the “Małopolska Agencja Prasowa” [Lesser Poland Region Press Agency], 
together with the following verdicts: public condemnation reprimand or death, which 
I shall discuss in more detail in the following sections. Another matter concerned 
the resistance movement’s failed operations, for example, unsuccessful attempts to 
liquidate informers or innocent people being accused of collaborating with the German 
authorities based on, for example, hearsay and unsubstantiated reports. There were 
also cases in which a diversionary unit was unable to gather the evidence required to 
execute a sentence – criminal reports often contained vague information on the suspect 
and their crimes, as well as reports made to underground organizations.
The Civil Special Court acting under the auspices of the  Directorate of Civil 
Resistance for the Krakow district began to function in the fi rst half of 1943. It 
maintained contact with the Special Military Court at the headquarters of the Home 
Army’s Krakow district. Underground courts enforced the orders of the Directorate of 
Civil Resistance. Serious crimes against the vital interests of the nation, state and its 
citizens, requiring immediate punishment, fell under the jurisdiction of the Special 
Civil Courts. Functioning at the lowest level of the underground justice systems were 
the Civil Resistance Court Commissions.88
The Special Civil Court operated in Krakow until October 1944.89 According to 
offi  cial releases of the underground press, the Krakow district SCC pronounced 67 death 
sentences against those guilty of collaborating with Nazi security and administration 
institutions.90 Offi  cially, 34 of those sentences were carried out before the end of the 
occupation (according to information provided by the underground press). Among those 
convicted were 15 Krakow citizens (seven death penalties, fi ve public condemnations, 
two reprimands). The others originated from such places as Brzesko, Trzebinia, Sokołów, 
Łańcut and Trzcina.91
Not all sentences were published in the underground newspapers; more were 
probably carried out in reality. For example, the “Żelbet” diversionary unit reported that 
between mid-1943 and July 1944, 29 people were executed (including two individuals 
86 J. Profi cz, Hasło ‘Jemioła’.
87  OSTASZ, Krakowska Okręgowa, 162.
88 OSTASZ, Krakowska Okręgowa, 159–162.
89 OSTASZ, Krakowska Okręgowa, 159–162.
90 OSTASZ, Krakowska Okręgowa, 165.
91 Calculations made by the author based on underground press releases:  Biuletyn Informacji Małopolskiej, no. 
16–47 (1943–1944); Wo lność, no. 46–57 (September–November 1943), where information on executions was 
published.
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whose names remain unknown).92 Only two of those deaths were announced by the 
press.93 The documents suggest that 63 Nazi collaborators were executed in the Krakow 
district. This may be a rough estimate, as only part of the fi le of the Krakow district of 
the ZWZ/AK has survived.
Some of the information regarding executions was actually false, and a number of 
individuals supposed to have been executed in fact escaped punishment: they left the 
city before they could be arrested. There is also the question of verdicts based merely 
on hearsay or the desire of the accuser for revenge. According to order no. 840/1 of 
the commander in chief of the Home Army of 11 August 1943, in the event that there 
was an immediate danger of Home Army soldiers being exposed, commanders were 
“entitled, as stated in the regulations, to eliminate the suspect on sight”. In the fall 
of 1943, the civil courts adopted a more “tolerant attitude” as a consequence of the 
merciless response of the German authorities (10 Poles were executed for every one 
informer killed by the resistance). As a consequence, many collaborators escaped 
punishment, and only some of them were held accountable for their actions after the 
war. Accusations against informers and denouncers were especially diffi  cult for post-
war prosecutors to investigate, as they were as hard to prove after the liberation as 
they were during the war.
The post-war settling of scores
In the fi nal year of the war, pursuant to the decree of 31 August 1944 “on the 
sentencing of Fascist-Nazi war criminals guilty of murder and torture of civilians and 
prisoners of war, as well as of traitors of the Polish Nation” the handling of cases 
involving war crimes became the primary concern of Polish DA offi  ces of Special 
Criminal Courts, Administration Courts, District Courts and the Supreme National 
Tribunal.94 By 22 July 1946, 8,838 indictments had been submitted to the Special 
Criminal Court; 4,593 cases were resolved; 306 people were sentenced to long-term 
imprisonment and 631 to death.95 The Supreme National Tribunal was established on 
21 January 1946; it continued to function until 1948. During that time, the tribunal 
convicted 40 war criminals; 20 of them were sentenced to death.
The archives of the Krakow branch of the Institute of National Remembrance 
show that 2,263 criminal cases were brought against defendants based on the above-
mentioned decree of 31 August 1944.96 According to the records of the Krakow Special 
Criminal Court, most of the cases cited above concerned denunciations and collaboration 
with the Nazi authorities during World War II. At this point in my research, I am unable 
to give an estimated number of post-war criminal cases concerning denunciation-
92 J. Profi cz, Hasło ‘Jemioła’. Calendar of operations of the “Żelbet” Group Guerilla Units by Stanisław Plucha, 
Kowary 1999 (manuscript in possession of the author). Details concerning sentences were presented by Piotr 
Szmigielski in his Ph D dissertation entitled Pododcinek IIB/Żelbet – rodowód, działalność i struktury jednostki 
Armii Krajowej w obrębie Obwodu Kraków-Miasto Inspektoratu Krakowskiego, Archiwum Pracy Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego [JU Theses Archive].
93 OSTASZ, Krakowska Okręgowa, 159–162.
94 Special Criminal Courts were initially set up by state authorities in Lublin, Warsaw (with temporary 
headquarters in Siedlce) and Krakow (with temporary headquarters in Rzeszów), and later on, in reinstated and 
newly created districts of the Courts of Appeals.
95  RZEPLIŃSKI, Przystosowanie ustroju sądownictwa, 16–21.
96 Data based on the inventory of criminal case fi les held in the archives of the Krakow branch of the Institute 
of National Remembrance.
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related off enses stricto sensu; it requires a more in-depth study. It results, among 
other things, from the fact that indictments rarely mentioned those charges. It was 
qualifi ed as treason or collaboration with the Nazis; more often than not, the fact that 
the defendant was a Nazi denouncer was not revealed until the criminal investigation. 
One of the examples is the case of Aniela S., Jan Ł., Mieczysław K. and Ludwik S., 
charged in 1945 with “acting to the detriment of Polish nationals”. As it turned out 
during witness hearings, in the autumn of 1943, Mrs Tańcul denounced two female 
Jews, who had lived at her house with a child, to the village leader, Mr Łańcuszka. The 
latter reported that to the Polish police station in Trąbki. M. K. and L. S., based on the 
abovementioned reports, came to Przebieczany and shot three Jews, i.e. two Jewish 
women and a child, and seized their property.
The prosecutors were unable to fi nd suffi  cient evidence to sentence them for their 
crimes. They were, instead, found guilty of participating in denouncing people assigned 
to forced labour in the Third Reich.97
Terminology introduced by the August Decree, defi ning collaboration with the 
German authorities, covers also overt or anonymous informants of the Gestapo 
who reported Poles and Jews wanted by the secret police, revealing their location, 
intimidation of tenants by threatening to denounce them to the Nazis, and sometimes 
also ostentatious support for the Nazi policy (such as hanging Hitler’s portrait on 
the walls, organizing meetings for Germans or using their protection). The post-war 
interpretation of the decree was rather general in nature and allowed punishment 
for various off enses. It mentioned numerous ways of acting to the detriment of the 
Polish state and its citizens, e.g. the reporting or arresting of wanted persons or those 
persecuted by the Nazis on grounds of their nationality, religion, race or for political 
reasons (which was all part of the denouncers’ activity during the war), extortion, 
participation in the killing of civilians or prisoners of war, participation in organized 
crime or otherwise acting to the detriment of the Polish state, Polish legal entities, 
civilians, military personnel or prisoners of war. It was also mentioned that “acting or 
failure to act under threat or upon orders does not release the accused from criminal 
responsibility” (art. 5, par 1). 
It was often hard to verify those accusations, not only due to the chaos that reigned 
at the time in the new, post-war reality, but also to other, more obvious reasons. 
Witnesses either died or left the country during the war or shortly afterwards, or it 
was impossible to locate them: they had in many cases gone into hiding for political 
reasons or had not returned from concentration camps. Others chose not to appear at 
hearings for fear of the revenge of those against whom they were supposed to testify. 
Old animosities were very much alive, and victims often lived close to their abusers or 
passed them on the streets of Krakow.98 The atmosphere in the entire country, at the 
time, was that of widespread insecurity and mistrust, which was yet another obstacle 
preventing victims from bringing denouncers – their neighbours or relatives – to justice.
Investigations that the authorities succeeded in opening were launched on the 
basis of oral or written statements usually submitted personally to a Citizens’ Militia 
station in the presence of a functionary; initial procedures were then put in motion, in 
accordance with protocols similar to those from the occupation period, including for the 
97 AIPN Kr, 07/490.
98  OLCZAK-RONIKIER, Wtedy.  STĘPIEŃ, Miasto opowiedziane.  STĘPIEŃ, Powroty krakowskich Żydow, 255–266.
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investigation proper and the court trial. Not every report led to criminal proceedings; 
sometimes proceed ings were suspended during the verifi cation stage. If a person 
decided to submit such a report after the war, they would usually chose the police 
station located closest to their place of residence – just as was the case during the 
occupation. The victims would testify against alleged informers, but then again so 
would people who, acting out revenge, made false accusations in their statements.99 
Thus, courts heard cases involving not only real informers, but also innocent people. 
Most cases concluded with acquittals, many of them, as I have already mentioned, being 
suspended during the investigation. It should also be mentioned that some cases were 
closed as the a llegations had been deemed unfounded; some of the off ense reports 
were based on conjecture, rumours or – quite often – desire for revenge, the settling 
of old scores or pure malice. Those cases had little in common with actual facts, and 
they became (similarly as during the occupation) a means to an end, such as the seizure 
of property, prospects of promotion at work etc.100 As this particular research area is 
broad and complex, and requires a separate study, I shall present below only a few 
selected examples of cases that came to trial. 
On 5 March 1945, the inhabitants of the tenement building at 4 Hetmańska Street 
wrote to the new, communist authorities of Krakow: 
Mr. and Mrs. Konik, who, between 1941 and 1944, were the caretakers at our 
house, during that time harassed and blackmailed almost all the residents for 
no reason whatsoever, insulting them, and using the most off ensive language. 
They were regular informers of the former “blue uniforms”; they frequented 
the police stations, reporting made-up “crimes”, allegedly committed by the 
tenants.101
The court found them not guilty
Many other cases ended in acqquittal or the prosecutors simply suspending 
proceedings. For example, the residents of Bawół Square were blackmailed by their 
neighbours, the P. family. In their trial after the war, several male and female caretakers 
from neighbouring houses testifi ed as witnesses, describing in detail the meetings of 
the accused with the Gestapo. They were not convicted, as the court found the evidence 
lacking – the testimonies of the witnesses were deemed insuffi  cient, even though they 
confi rmed that these events had indeed taken place.
99 False reports of off enses not committed were supposed to be prosecuted as off enses against the course 
of justice consisting in reporting an off ense to an authority responsible for instigating criminal proceedings 
in full awareness of the fact that the said off ense was not committed. Those guilty of that crime were to be 
subject to adequate sanctions, in accordance with procedures similar to those from WWII. During the war, these 
off enses were punished, based on evidence gathered, with several months to a year in prison. After the war, as 
I have already mentioned, it was more diffi  cult to gather information, witnesses were dead or feared revenge 
from those closest to them, or were impossible to locate. In the post-war chaos accompanying the creation of 
new legal and state structures, as well as numerous crimes (see:  ZAREMBA, Wielka trwoga.), many cases and 
proceedings instigated by the prosecution were discontinued, the defendants being exonerated due to lack of 
evidence.
100 I am currently unable to give more accurate statistical data. I am still working on that problem as part of the 
aforementioned National Center for Science grant-funded research.
101 AIPN Kr, 502/120, Leon K. case fi le; he was accused of collaborating with the Gestapo and denouncing 
a Polish man to the Nazis who in turn later on arrested him.
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In November 1945, a judge by the name of Bartynowski discontinued an investigation 
into a report made several months earlier by the caretaker of 5 Biskupia Street in Krakow 
in which he accused Irina Albon of threatening civilians that she would denounce them 
to the Gestapo. He also claimed that she extorted money and blackmailed the local 
community. An investigation showed that Albon, who was a Czech Jew, went into hiding 
in 1942 using false Aryan papers, and tenants’ suspicions regarding her behaviour 
were due to mistrust and prejudice. They feared her because she kept to herself and 
met with strangers at diff erent times of the day. She was a newcomer who kept her 
distance from her neighbours.102
Conclusions
Collaboration with the Germans during World War II was both institutionalized and 
informal, forced and voluntary, and people who decided to become Nazi informers 
and, among other things, denounced their Jewish neighbours, their colleagues working 
for the resistance, or brothers-in-law they disliked and wanted out of the apartment, 
did so overtly or anonymously. They made oral statements at German or Polish police 
stations or wrote letters to the Gestapo. Sometimes they even used both channels, 
counting on a swifter response from the authorities. Those who were more desperate 
provided the date of their visit at the station or the time that had elapsed since their 
last letter (“I informed the police a week ago”).103 They emphasized the fact that it was 
their second or third report. Such a letter would begin, for example, with the heading: 
“To the Secret State Police in Krakow. This is letter no. 2”.104 One of the characteristic 
features of written statements was their matter-of-factness and the multiplicity of 
problems addressed in those letters. They often contained more than one accusation, 
such as illegal trading engaged in by a person of Jewish origin, or the crime of working 
for the resistance (for example, “he trades in coal without a permit, selling coal to Jews 
at prices bordering on usury”),105 which shows the authors’ determined eff orts to have 
their enemies punished.
Very few of the informers and confi dants were part of the criminal underworld before 
the war.106 Collaborators were an entirely new category created by the occupation. Their 
actions were motivated mostly by the rapidly changing situation in the city, forcing 
them to adapt to the new totalitarian regime, which created many opportunities for the 
making of “easy money” or the fi nding of lucrative jobs, while at the same time allowing 
them to settle old scores or resolve new confl icts. In the fi rst years of the occupation, 
informers primarily kept a lookout for any infringements of the law committed by their 
fellow citizens; less frequently they were asked to report on those in contact with the 
resistance or Jews concealing their identity. This changed in 1942 and 1943, when the 
top priority for agents became the exposing of members of the underground and Jews 
with illegal Aryan papers etc., as well as the people helping them.
Informers and denouncers were the most eff ective means by which the occupier 
could maintain control over society. They fi lled the “gaps” in police activities, 
102 Contents of denunciations. Private collection of the author.
103 Private collection of the author.
104 Private collection of the author.
105 Private collection of the author.
106 See:  ENGELKING – GRABOWSKI, Żydów łamiących prawo należy karać śmiercią!. J ARKOWSKA-NATKANIEC, 
Criminal Cases.
88
ensuring Krakow and its citizens were under complete and constant surveillance. 
As a consequence, the Nazi authorities were informed, on an ongoing basis, of the 
situation in the city. Caretakers monitored the behaviour of tenants, neighbours were 
suspicious of new residents – and after the war, they accused one another of being 
Nazi informers. Those who actually reported on them often wrote letters in German 
in an eff ort to remain anonymous.107 They feared for their safety (and were afraid of 
collective responsibility), or – conversely – were trying to get attention. Stefania S., 
the author of one denunciation from 1943, provided her personal details in the letter, 
along with a note stating that “I, the undersigned, may testify under oath in a court 
of law”. Besides, as Wolfgang Sofsky wrote: “Informers and spies were smuggled into 
areas of possible activity that eluded surveillance – a second, secret, auxiliary band 
of traitors to keep tabs on the offi  cial agents”.108
SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Heinrich August Dietrich Heinemeyer, an offi  cer of the 
Krakow Gestapo, interrogated after the war by the prosecution of the Special Criminal 
Court in Krakow, testifi ed that the number of denunciations received by the German 
authorities during the occupation was so high that they had been unable to verify all 
of them.109 This is a rather general statement; however, considering the fact that even 
in September 1939, the Gestapo in Łódź received approximately 40 denunciations per 
day,110 it might have been true. Heinemeyer, who in 1940 was appointed head of the 
Krakow KdS and in 1943 head of Subdivision IV-A-1 responsible for combating Polish 
left-wing organizations, relied on his colleagues or subordinates for information. Maria 
Hochberg-Mariańska, a Jew using “Aryan papers”, who worked with a local resistance 
cell, claimed that “Krakow was less infested with denouncers and blackmailers than 
Warsaw was”.111 Hochberg-Mariańska’s words also explain little. However, unlike 
Heinemeyer, she was part of a group that was in immediate danger of being denounced 
by informers – she was a Jew in hiding who worked with members of the Home Army, 
which did not begin trying to eradicate this vile practice until 1943, even though the 
underground press had offi  cially condemned denouncers a year before. 
The eff orts of the Krakow resistance to combat Nazi collaborators were far from 
a resounding success. In the entire Krakow district, only 63 individuals were executed, 
and 15 individuals from the city were denounced in the public press, whereas almost 
2000 agents were active in the district. It should be noted that not all the information 
provided on confi dants and denouncers was credible – which probably explains the 
limited results of the resistance in this area; the overwhelming presence of the Germans 
in the city was also not without signifi cance. 
The German occupation of Krakow changed, and somewhat radically, the deeply 
entrenched social fabric of the city and the mentality of its inhabitants, violating 
many values; it deepened the divide between ethnic groups, heightened mistrust and 
stirred up latent anti-Semitism. Jews fell victim to post-war pogroms (particularly in 
Kielce and Krakow in 1945 and 1946) or were forced to leave the country.112 Those who 
107 Anonymous denunciations intercepted by the resistance. The author’s own private collection. 
108  SOFSKY, Ustrój terroru, 213.
109 AIPN, sign. 502/2246, Kurt Heinemeyer criminal case fi le.
110  BORODZIEJ, Terror i polityka, 57.
111  HOCHBERG-MARIAŃSKA – MARIAŃSKI, Wśród przyjaciół i wrogów, 29.
112 These events were described by:  STĘPIEŃ, Miasto opowiedziane.  TOKARSKA-BAKIR, Pod klątwą.  TOKARSKA-
BAKIR, Okrzyki pogromowe.  CICHOPEK, Pogrom Żydów w Krakowie.  KWIEK, Wydarzenia antyżydowskie, 77–89.
89
decided to stay in Krakow often had to pass their oppressors on the street. Only some 
of them reported their crimes to the Citizens’ Militia; usually, they testifi ed before 
local branches of Jewish Commissions. The two institutions cooperated, exchanging 
documentation.113 The same witnesses were interrogated repeatedly. Many members of 
the militia had also served in the criminal police or the Polish police. As a consequence, 
they were mistrusted, as many members of the Jewish community remembered their 
participation in the operations launched against them.
The courtroom became the perfect platform for resolving neighbourly or political 
confl icts – it gave the claimants an instrument to bring (real or alleged) collaborators to 
justice. In the years that followed, the new Communist regime used the August Decree 
to deal with its political enemies.
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